Southeast Europe has entered a new nuclear planning cycle. Romania is advancing Europe’s most developed small modular reactor proposal, Bulgaria is seeking financing for two AP1000 units at Kozloduy, and Slovenia continues preparatory work for JEK 2. Together, the projects could reshape regional power markets—but their combined ambitions run into tens of billions of euros.
Romania’s Nuclearelectrica shareholders approved a conditional final investment decision for the Doicești SMR project in February 2026. The plan replaces a former 600 MW coal station with six NuScale modules of 77 MW each, for 462 MW total. Official project communications estimate around 4,000 jobs across development, construction, manufacturing and operations, including approximately 200 permanent positions.
Cost is the central uncertainty. Published estimates range from roughly €4.9 billion to $6–7 billion. Romania has discussed up to $3 billion of support from the US Export-Import Bank and $1 billion from the US International Development Finance Corporation, but commitments, drawdown conditions and the final capital structure still require resolution. Nuclearelectrica said in May 2026 that teams were working on financing, licensing, cost optimisation and a commercially viable power price. Its clarification is important: approval to proceed into the next development stage is not the same as an unconditional construction commitment at a fixed price.
Bulgaria’s proposed Kozloduy Units 7 and 8 would use Westinghouse AP1000 technology and provide around 2,300 MW combined. Citi has been appointed exclusive coordinator and export-credit arranger, described as its largest nuclear-financing assignment in Central and Eastern Europe. The financing amount was not disclosed. Unit 7 is targeted for 2033, with Unit 8 later.
Slovenia’s JEK 2 is another scale entirely for a small economy. Public estimates have ranged from €9.6 billion to €15.4 billion depending on reactor size and assumptions. A proposed referendum was cancelled in 2024 amid legal and transparency concerns, although project preparation continued. Because the existing Krško plant is jointly owned by Slovenia and Croatia, any replacement or expansion has cross-border commercial and political significance.
The projects share a strategic rationale: preserve firm low-carbon generation as coal closes and solar and wind expand. Nuclear output can reduce gas imports, support industrial demand and stabilise renewable-heavy systems. They also share three risks—construction delay, cost escalation and the need for state-backed revenue or financing.
No SEE electricity market can absorb a first-of-a-kind nuclear project on merchant revenues alone. Governments will have to choose among contracts for difference, state guarantees, regulated asset models, export-credit finance and direct public ownership. Each method transfers risk differently between taxpayers, consumers, developers and lenders. Transparent disclosure of expected electricity prices and downside exposure is therefore essential.
The region is not merely choosing reactor technologies. It is choosing which risks to carry for several decades. Doicești could establish an SMR supply chain, Kozloduy could make Bulgaria a major exporter of firm power, and JEK 2 could reinforce the Slovenia-Croatia partnership. But the projects that succeed will be those with credible financing and governance, not simply the most ambitious capacity announcements.
