Romania’s demand-flexibility market framework took effect with a crisis-only constraint, while a new demand-response mechanism entered into force on 26 August. The mechanism was initially described by energy regulator ANRE as a voluntary instrument for eligible consumers, suppliers and aggregators. Under that earlier description, reductions in electricity consumption would be offered to transmission system operator Transelectrica and paid when selected. The final regulation, however, narrows the circumstances for activation.
On 19 August, ANRE presented demand flexibility as not reserved exclusively for crisis situations. The regulator described it as an economic mechanism under which consumers could decide when reducing consumption was more valuable than continuing to use electricity. Order 54/2026, published in Romania’s Official Gazette on 26 August, sets out that activation applies only in defined crisis situations affecting operation of the national electricity system. These include national shortages threatening system adequacy, regional or European supply crises, extended extreme weather, and prolonged outages of interconnectors or internal transmission lines that constrain imports.
The Order also covers other emergency situations identified by the national dispatcher. The scope of activation is commercially significant for market participants that would otherwise expect regular monetisation of flexibility. A continuously accessible demand-response market could support investments in telemetry, automation, industrial-load control and customer acquisition. A mechanism activated mainly during system stress is instead closer to an emergency reserve than a recurring flexibility product.
Crisis trigger based on day-ahead and balancing market outcomes
Under the published rules, Transelectrica assesses whether the mechanism is needed after reviewing the day-ahead and balancing markets over the previous five completed working days. The trigger includes cases where selling offers have systematically failed to provide sufficient adequacy relative to electricity demand in individual trading intervals. Once activated, the mechanism applies through daily auctions for selected working-day intervals. Consumption flexibility is traded in 15-minute periods, matching Romania’s imbalance-settlement interval.
The minimum quantity that may be offered is 0.5 MW. Eligible providers include dispatchable consumers, electricity suppliers and aggregators participating in the day-ahead market. End-users must have remotely readable meters to participate. Customers already qualified and participating as balancing-service providers are excluded from simultaneously supplying the new service.
Transelectrica publishes the required reduction volume two days ahead of delivery. Offers are ranked by price and accepted until the required volume has been covered. The mechanism can run only for the period considered strictly necessary and for no more than one month without a new assessment. This operational design affects how often aggregators can expect activations.
Auction design, metering baseline and aggregation requirements
The requirement for remotely readable metering makes digital infrastructure a prerequisite for participation rather than an optional upgrade. The mechanism also includes a baseline against which delivered flexibility is measured. Transelectrica and metering operators compare actual consumption with reference consumption based on previous operating periods.
For aggregators, baseline accuracy is central because demand response has value only if the market distinguishes genuine load reduction from electricity that would not have been consumed anyway. The 0.5 MW minimum offer size also makes pooling relevant for smaller flexible loads. A single large factory could qualify directly, while supermarkets, refrigeration facilities, commercial buildings, pumping systems and smaller industrial users would need to be aggregated.
Voluntary offers and limits on activation frequency
Participation is voluntary: eligible consumers specify both the amount they are prepared to reduce and the price required. Accepted offers become firm transactions and are verified against metering data. This structure turns load reduction into a traded product rather than an administrative instruction issued by authorities.
The final rule language stops short of establishing a continuously functioning flexibility exchange. With activation tied to defined crisis conditions rather than ordinary market periods, revenue expectations depend on how frequently Transelectrica can invoke the mechanism. An aggregator investing around €1 million in industrial controls, metering interfaces, forecasting software and customer contracts would need enough activations to recover costs.
If activations occur during ordinary high-price and tight-system periods, they could support a commercial flexibility industry; if limited to exceptional adequacy or emergency events, expected annual revenues become harder to predict . Industrial consumers face different participation needs depending on load size: a large energy-intensive factory may curtail production if compensation exceeds its lost operating margin without requiring dozens of activations per year . Smaller flexible loads generate lower individual revenues, so aggregators may need higher activation frequency or access to multiple value streams.
The rules also indicate that business models may rely on combining this mechanism with balancing participation and portfolio optimisation alongside behind-the-meter energy management and potentially future DSO flexibility services rather than depending on one product alone . For Southeast European power markets, Romania’s approach highlights an unresolved question about whether flexible demand should compete every day with generation or remain a strategic tool activated only when conventional electricity markets are under stress . Romania has now built the auction machinery; what remains uncertain is how often it will be allowed to run .
