The quiet decision to lift Serbia’s decades-old ban on nuclear power has triggered a shift in the strategic imagination of the region. For the first time since the Chernobyl-era prohibition, Serbia can legally and politically evaluate the possibility of constructing nuclear reactors — a move that has implications far beyond electricity production. It touches geopolitics, alliances, regional coordination, market dynamics, regulatory harmonization, public legitimacy, financing doctrines and the very identity of Serbia’s long-term energy strategy. Nuclear power is not simply an engineering project; it is a geopolitical instrument. Whoever builds reactors in Serbia will shape the country’s orientation for generations.
This is why the moment the ban was lifted, a chessboard quietly emerged. The players are powerful, the stakes are high, and the region’s response will define the shape of the Balkans’ energy future. While Serbia is still at an early stage — exploring feasibility studies, consulting international partners, and testing public acceptance — the world around it has already begun to move. The competition for influence has started.
One must first understand that Serbia is not entering a vacuum. The Western Balkans sit within a dense, evolving nuclear corridor stretching from Central Europe to the Black Sea. Slovenia operates the Krško nuclear plant with Croatia as a co-owner and is advancing discussions on Krško II. Bulgaria, long a nuclear power, is preparing new units at Kozloduy, increasingly aligned with Western suppliers. Hungary is expanding Paks with Russian technology, creating one of the most geopolitically sensitive nuclear builds in Europe. Romania has become the first European state to commit to Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), partnering with the United States and moving with exceptional political unity. Turkey is completing Akkuyu with Rosatom and planning additional reactors. Even Greece has begun discussing nuclear options as part of its long-term decarbonization planning.
Into this landscape comes Serbia — a country that until recently avoided even the language of nuclear power but now finds itself at the center of a regional puzzle. Its decision, eventually, will not happen in isolation. Nuclear development is regulated not only nationally but through a lattice of cross-border environmental agreements, EU treaties, safety conventions, regional electricity-market structures and diplomatic expectations. Any Serbian nuclear project — whether a full-scale reactor or an SMR cluster — will require alignment with neighbours on emergency protocols, environmental impacts, water-use agreements, cooling-system assessments and cross-border notification requirements. This regional interplay is where the nuclear chessboard becomes visible.
The first major player to position itself is France. No country in Europe has invested more political capital in promoting nuclear energy as a central decarbonization tool. French diplomacy has already supported Serbia’s preliminary studies, and France’s industrial ecosystem — EDF, Framatome, Orano — offers Serbia what may be the most comprehensive package: technology, financing, regulatory support, training, safety culture and European political backing. In a moment when Serbia is balancing between strategic neutrality and EU integration, a French nuclear partnership would anchor the country more firmly in Europe’s energy and political architecture. France sees Serbia not only as a market but as a strategic foothold in a region where nuclear narratives are re-emerging. For France, supporting Serbian nuclear development is consistent with its broader diplomatic goal to revitalize nuclear cooperation across Europe.
A second major player is the United States, whose resurgence in the nuclear field has been tied to SMRs. Through companies such as NuScale, Westinghouse and GE Hitachi, the U.S. is aggressively promoting small reactors as a flexible, modular alternative to traditional nuclear. Serbia’s political leadership has maintained close ties with Washington even while navigating complex relations with Moscow. A U.S.-Serbia nuclear partnership would signal deepened strategic alignment, especially as American influence rises in Romania’s SMR deployment and in ongoing nuclear discussions in Poland, Bulgaria and Czechia. SMRs may be particularly relevant to Serbia if the country chooses a smaller, distributed nuclear architecture rather than a single gigawatt-scale plant.
South Korea, through KHNP, is another increasingly credible competitor. Korean nuclear technology is gaining traction globally due to its reliability, cost competitiveness, and delivery record. Hungary has engaged with Korea for reactor components, and several Middle Eastern countries are exploring Korean nuclear partnerships. Korea may view Serbia as an opportunity to expand its footprint in Europe, offering strong construction capabilities and competitive financing.
China also remains a potential aspirant. China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC) have advanced reactor designs and significant financing power. While political sensitivities exist — especially in the EU accession context — China retains economic influence in Serbia through infrastructure, mining, manufacturing and energy projects. A Chinese nuclear offer would come with favorable financing but also geopolitical complications that may be too heavy for Serbia as it seeks to maintain balanced relations with the West. Nonetheless, China cannot be dismissed as a potential bidder.
Then comes Russia, historically Serbia’s closest partner in the energy sector. Rosatom is one of the world’s most experienced nuclear developers, with projects spanning Europe, Africa and Asia. But Serbia’s political calculus has shifted dramatically. Nuclear cooperation with Russia today would be virtually incompatible with EU accession ambitions, would trigger Western pressure and could jeopardize Serbia’s financial access to European institutions. While Rosatom has the technical capability, the geopolitical cost for Serbia may be prohibitive. Russia’s role is therefore likely to be symbolic rather than practical, unless Serbia were to radically realign its foreign policy — a scenario currently unrealistic.
Serbia’s decision will not be shaped solely by external offers. The internal politics of nuclear development are complex. A nuclear plant is a generational investment that requires long-term political consensus, public legitimacy and institutional stability. Serbia has none of these guaranteed. Public opinion is mixed, reflecting a still potent memory of Chernobyl and skepticism about institutional capacity. The regulatory infrastructure is embryonic. Emergency preparedness systems require wholesale modernization. Universities lack nuclear engineering programs. Skilled personnel must be developed almost from scratch.
Yet Serbia’s political leadership understands that nuclear power could serve multiple strategic objectives: diversification away from coal, reduction of dependence on imported electricity, stabilization of the grid during renewable volatility, enhancement of regional influence and alignment with European decarbonization pathways. Nuclear energy offers a long-term shield against climate-driven hydropower fluctuations and against the fragility of Serbia’s thermal fleet. It is not simply a technological choice; it is a strategic redefinition of national energy identity.
But Serbia cannot decide alone. Nuclear development in the Balkans is inherently interdependent. Croatia and Slovenia, through their joint stewardship of the Krško nuclear plant, will closely watch Serbia’s choices. Their cooperation model — cross-border ownership, shared financing, harmonized regulation — may influence Serbia’s planning. Any reactor built near Serbian borders will require Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to participate in environmental impact procedures under the Espoo Convention. These countries may support Serbia’s nuclear entry if it strengthens regional energy stability, or they may resist it if they perceive risk or geopolitical imbalance.
Romania, advancing its SMR project at Doicești, will have its own interests. Serbia joining the nuclear club could create new regional synergies, including shared training programs, coordinated safety frameworks and cross-border electricity flows that stabilize the SEE grid. But Romania may also view Serbia as a competitor for Western financing and technological partnerships.
Bulgaria, with Kozloduy’s expansion underway, will similarly calculate its response in terms of market dynamics, regional influence and cross-border cooperation. A Serbia that becomes a nuclear state shifts the power balance in Southeast Europe’s electricity markets, especially in winter when baseload scarcity shapes pricing.
Hungary, through its heavily politicized Paks II project, may view Serbia’s nuclear ambitions through the lens of its relationship with Russia and its attempts to maintain a hybrid geopolitical alignment. If Serbia leans toward Western reactor suppliers, Hungary may perceive a drift away from regional pro-Russian energy spheres.
North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, though not nuclear candidates themselves, will have stakes in downstream effects such as cross-border safety protocols, imported power prices and cooling-water resource management. All Balkan nations will scrutinize Serbia’s environmental assessments, reactor siting and emergency plans, as nuclear decisions transcend national boundaries.
Against this complex backdrop, Serbia must determine not only which technology it prefers but which geopolitical path it is willing to align with. Nuclear construction is a 60-year partnership. The reactor supplier becomes part of Serbia’s strategic infrastructure, financial ecosystem, diplomatic posture and national security configuration. Choosing France, the U.S., Korea or another Western partner would anchor Serbia more firmly in the Euro-Atlantic system. Choosing Russia or China would alter Serbia’s geopolitical trajectory at a moment when EU accession remains its stated long-term goal.
As Serbia weighs its options, one must also consider the internal technical debate. Will Serbia pursue a large gigawatt-scale reactor, which offers economies of scale but requires enormous financing, a robust grid and highly developed regulatory capacity? Or will it choose SMRs, which can be deployed incrementally, provide flexible capacity and align with Serbia’s gradual transition ambitions? SMRs may be more compatible with Serbia’s hydrological variability, renewable expansion and grid constraints. They also avoid the single-point-of-failure risk inherent in large reactors. But SMRs remain commercially unproven at scale. Serbia would be among early adopters, exposing itself to technological, cost and schedule uncertainties.
In this sense, Serbia stands at the confluence of opportunity and risk. Nuclear power offers the promise of long-term stability, decarbonization and autonomy. But it also requires a new regulatory architecture, new institutional capacities, new safety cultures and new diplomatic alignments. The decision will be irreversible for generations, shaping not only energy strategy but Serbia’s international identity.
The chessboard is set. France has moved first with studies and diplomatic engagement. The United States looms with SMR technology and geopolitical weight. Korea offers cost-effective engineering. China and Russia remain possible, though fraught. Neighbours monitor closely, balancing support with self-interest. Serbia must decide how deeply it wishes to anchor itself in the European energy future and how boldly it is willing to embrace nuclear modernization.
Whatever Serbia chooses, the regional landscape will shift. New cross-border protocols will be negotiated. Emergency-response frameworks will be harmonized. Cooling-water impacts will be shared. Electricity markets will rebalance around new baseload anchors. Nuclear power will redefine Southeast Europe’s political economy of energy.
Serbia is now a player in a nuclear corridor that stretches from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, from Central Europe to the Adriatic. The decision it makes in the coming years — technology, partners, governance — will echo far beyond its borders. Nuclear energy, once unthinkable, has become a decisive question of Serbia’s national direction.
