For more than half a century, the Balkans lived inside a predictable energy ecosystem: electricity from domestic coal, oil and gas pipelines dominated by Russia, and infrastructure built in the socialist era. But the past decade — and especially the post-2022 global energy upheaval — has shattered that old order.
A new geometry is forming. It is a geometry built not on ideology, but on corridors, connectors, interconnectors, LNG flows, strategic gas routes, renewable megaprojects, and a competition between global energy powers seeking to anchor themselves in a region that touches the EU, the Black Sea, the Adriatic, and the wider Mediterranean.
The Balkans are no longer an energy periphery.
They are becoming a crossroads — and crossroads are geopolitical.
This is the redefined map of energy influence shaping the region today.
The collapse of a monopoly: From Russian centrality to multi-supplier reality
For decades, the Balkans operated inside a near-monopolistic environment. Russia supplied almost all imported gas to Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and parts of Bulgaria. Moscow’s position was so entrenched that diversification was considered politically sensitive, technically complicated, and economically unattractive.
That world collapsed almost overnight.
After the global energy shock of 2022, all Balkan governments — EU members and non-members — were forced to rethink fundamentals. What emerged is a landscape where Russia remains important but no longer unchallenged.
The region today is supplied by Azerbaijan via the Southern Gas Corridor, LNG from Greece and Croatia, gas arriving through Turkey, increasing EU-backed interconnectors, and a growing layer of renewables financed by Gulf, Chinese, and European capital. During crises, governments still fall back on coal to keep the grid alive, but they are slowly pushed toward cleaner systems by economics, regulation and public pressure.
No single actor has replaced Russia. Instead, the Balkans now live inside a pluralistic, competitive, fragmented energy geometry, shaped by shifting alliances and infrastructure corridors.
Interconnectors: The new arteries of Balkan energy sovereignty
The single most transformative trend is the explosion of interconnector construction.
In the old system, each Balkan state was an energy island. Today, pipelines and cables connect Greece to Bulgaria, Bulgaria to Serbia, Serbia to Hungary, Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia to Greece, and Albania to the continental gas and power network through TAP and future LNG capacity.
Every new pipe, cable or valve reduces the strategic weight of any one supplier and increases the bargaining power of Balkan states.
These interconnectors rewire the political map.
They create choice — and choice is geopolitical autonomy.
The Balkans are finally gaining something they lacked for decades: redundancy. Multiple import points mean no single actor can shut down the system without alternatives stepping in.
The entrance of new players: Caspian, Gulf, Mediterranean, Asian
The most dramatic shift in the new energy geometry is the arrival of new suppliers and investors.
Azerbaijan has become a key new gas provider, feeding Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia and presenting itself as a Eurasian bridge into South-East Europe. The Gulf states — especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia — are entering through renewable parks, grid modernization and financial partnerships. The Eastern Mediterranean is increasingly relevant as Greek LNG terminals draw in gas from the US, Qatar and others, then push it north into the Balkans.
At the same time, China is present through coal plant financing, large industrial complexes and wind and solar projects, while Turkey positions itself as an indispensable transit corridor linking Caspian, Russian and Middle Eastern gas to the region.
The result is a crowded field.
The Balkans are no longer a passive endpoint; they are a competition zone.
The new heart of the system: Greece and Bulgaria’s unexpected rise
Two countries have quietly become the backbone of Balkan diversification: Greece and Bulgaria.
Greece, once a marginal player, is now an LNG gateway and a power-market hub. Its terminals and pipelines anchor gas flows that reach deep into North Macedonia, Serbia and beyond. Its electricity interconnections make it a key node for both imports and exports of power in the wider region.
Bulgaria, previously a captive transit state for a single supplier, is now a balancing point for Caspian gas, LNG from Greece, and flows moving north and west. It sits at the centre of a network that touches Romania, Serbia, North Macedonia and the Black Sea.
In the new geometry, Greece and Bulgaria act as gatekeepers. For capitals like Belgrade, Skopje and Sarajevo, energy strategy now begins with questions about Greek LNG capacity and Bulgarian interconnector availability.
The longevity of coal: A Balkan paradox
Despite political declarations and green rhetoric, much of the region still runs on lignite.
Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia rely on aging coal fleets that are socially embedded and politically sensitive. These plants keep electricity affordable and jobs intact, but they clash with climate commitments and EU policy trends.
This creates a structural tension:
Coal keeps the lights on.
Gas provides a transition bridge.
Renewables promise the long-term exit.
Interconnectors provide political autonomy.
The new geometry must incorporate this paradox rather than pretending it doesn’t exist. The transition will not be a clean line toward decarbonization. It will be messy, staggered and uneven.
The silent revolution: Balkan electricity markets plugging Into Europe
While headlines focus on gas, the more profound change is in electricity markets.
The Balkans are being drawn into European trading platforms, day-ahead markets, balancing mechanisms and cross-border auctions. Grid codes are harmonized, interconnection capacity upgraded, and market coupling expands step by step.
What this means in practice is that the region is turning into part of a single continental power system even before all its states join the EU. A hydro surplus in one country can directly impact prices in another; a windy week in Romania can depress prices in North Macedonia; a nuclear outage elsewhere can ripple into the Balkans within hours.
Market integration is quietly doing what politics struggles to achieve: tying the region into a shared European energy space.
Serbia’s triangular balancing act: Russia – EU – Azerbaijan
Serbia sits at the centre of the region’s most intricate triangle.
Its historic gas dependence is tied to Russia.
Its new diversification routes run through Greece and Bulgaria and are fed by Azerbaijan and LNG.
Its electricity markets are increasingly influenced by EU rules and prices.
Its biggest industrial consumers include Chinese-owned mines and metal plants.
Its future power projects involve partnerships with both Eastern and Western investors.
Belgrade is becoming the textbook case of multi-vector energy policy: using every corridor, every supplier, every investor to maintain maximum room for manoeuvre.
This gives Serbia leverage. But it also multiplies points of vulnerability. A technical incident in the Caspian, a regulatory shock in Brussels, a disruption in Turkish transit, or an environmental crackdown on Chinese-owned industry can all shake Serbia’s energy balance.
Winners and losers in the new Balkan energy order
The new geometry produces clear winners and losers — but they are not fixed categories.
Countries with strong interconnectors, diversified suppliers and access to LNG and renewables gain bargaining power and resilience. Those without such infrastructure remain exposed to price spikes, supply shocks and political pressure.
Utilities that adapt early to market integration, green policy and cross-border trade become regional champions; those that cling to protected monopolies risk being left behind. Communities dependent on old lignite mines and plants face existential questions; regions hosting new renewable, gas and interconnector projects may become the new industrial and energy hubs.
The biggest winner, however, is any state that understands that energy is no longer just fuel. It is infrastructure, diplomacy, regulation, finance and narrative control, all fused into a single strategic domain.
The new geometry in one sentence
The Balkans have shifted from a single-axis, single-supplier energy system to a multi-source, multi-corridor, multi-actor network where gas, electricity and renewables flow along intersecting routes shaped as much by politics as by physics.
Pipelines no longer represent dominance.
They represent options.
Future scenario analysis (2030–2040)
The next decade will decide whether this new geometry stabilizes into a resilient, integrated system — or fractures under the weight of competing interests, delayed transitions and political shocks. Three broad scenarios illustrate the range of possible futures for 2030–2040.
Green acceleration with controlled gas dependence
In the first scenario, the region gradually delivers on its climate and integration promises. By the mid-2030s, the Balkans have:
significantly reduced coal generation,
scaled up utility-scale solar and wind,
modernized grids with digital control and storage,
and locked in diversified gas supply mainly as a flexible backup rather than a dominant fuel.
In this world, Greece and Croatia serve as LNG safety valves, Azerbaijan provides stable baseline gas flows, and interconnectors knit the region into the EU’s energy market. Serbia and its neighbours retain some gas-fired capacity but increasingly rely on renewables, regional power trade and demand management.
Energy security debates shift from “Who supplies our gas?” to “How do we integrate variable renewables and keep prices stable?” The key strategic assets are not just pipelines and terminals but storage, smart grids, and cross-border transmission lines.
Winners in this scenario are countries that commit early to renewables, grid upgrades and regional coordination. Losers are those that delay restructuring of coal assets and miss the first wave of green capital.
Gas-bridge lock-in and slow transition
The second scenario is more conservative. Here, coal is gradually reduced, but instead of a rapid move into renewables, the Balkans lean heavily on gas as the transition fuel — for longer than planned.
New gas-fired plants in Serbia, Croatia, North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina play a central role in baseload supply. LNG terminals, Caspian pipes and Turkish transit routes become structural pillars of the system. Renewables grow, but at a modest pace, slowed by permitting problems, social resistance and limited grid capacity.
The region gains short-term stability and reasonably predictable prices, but it risks a carbon-lock-in: by the late 2030s, the Balkans find themselves with a large gas fleet at exactly the moment when EU climate policy tightens further. Financing for gas assets becomes more expensive, and pressure mounts to retrofit or retire plants earlier than economically optimal.
Winners here are the gas suppliers and infrastructure operators who enjoy extended relevance. Losers are utilities and governments that must later absorb the cost of accelerated decarbonization or pay rising penalties in the form of carbon pricing and lost competitiveness.
Fragmented transition and crisis management mode
In the third scenario, political instability, delayed investment and global shocks prevent the region from forming a coherent transition strategy.
Some countries press ahead with renewables; others cling to coal; gas investments happen in an ad hoc manner. Regional cooperation suffers from mistrust and competing alliances. Interconnectors exist on paper but are underused due to regulatory friction or political quarrels.
Energy crises become cyclical: a cold winter, a drought, a supply interruption or a price spike in a major hub can trigger rolling emergencies. Countries scramble for spot cargoes, re-open old plants, and negotiate emergency support from neighbours.
In this world, the new energy geometry exists physically but fails politically. The hardware is there, but the software — governance, trust, regulation, market design — lags behind.
Short-term winners are suppliers who profit from volatility and opaque deals. Long-term losers are households, industries and governments facing repeated shocks, high prices and lost investment opportunities.
Integrated continental node
There is also a more ambitious, hybrid scenario: by 2040, the Balkans become a fully integrated continental energy node, not just catching up with Europe but contributing actively to its energy transformation.
In this future, the region leverages its hydro potential, solar and wind resources, strategic location and interconnectors to become:
an exporter of clean electricity to Central Europe in peak periods,
a transit corridor for diversified gas flows,
a location for green-hydrogen pilots linked to heavy industry and transport,
and a magnet for advanced manufacturing linked to clean energy.
Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and their neighbours coordinate long-term planning, align regulations, and attract a new wave of investment that sees the Balkans not as a periphery but as a strategic energy platform.
This is the most demanding scenario. It requires political stability, deep regulatory reforms, skilful diplomacy and disciplined industrial policy. But if achieved, it would turn the Balkans from a problem zone into one of Europe’s most important energy transition corridors.
What decides which scenario wins?
The path between now and 2040 will be shaped less by geology and more by governance:
whether Balkan states fully use their interconnectors or treat them as political trophies;
whether they unlock renewables with serious planning or drown them in bureaucracy;
whether they manage coal phase-out with social justice or resist until crisis forces abrupt closure;
whether they treat new suppliers — from Azerbaijan to LNG providers and Gulf investors — as partners in a balanced portfolio or as substitutes for old dependencies.
The new energy geometry in the Balkans is still fluid.
By 2030–2040, it will either solidify into a resilient, multi-source, integrated system — or harden into a patchwork of half-finished projects, stranded assets and missed opportunities.
The region has, for the first time in decades, real options.
What it lacks is not pipes or cables, but a clear, shared decision on what kind of energy future it wants to build.
Powered by www.virtu.energy
