For almost four decades, Serbia lived under a symbolic and legislative boundary that shaped its entire energy identity: a ban on the construction of nuclear power plants, introduced in the late Yugoslav era after the Chernobyl disaster. That prohibition was not only a legal framework but a psychological marker that defined how the country imagined its technological risk, its energy choices and its strategic responsibilities. Nuclear energy belonged to a past world of Cold War superpowers and catastrophic accidents. Serbia, like much of the region, turned instead to coal, hydropower and later renewables as the pillars of its energy mix.
The ground shifted this year. A French-led feasibility study, conducted in collaboration with Serbian institutions, concluded that nuclear energy is both technically and economically viable for Serbia. Soon after, the national ban was officially lifted. The decision does not signal that nuclear construction will begin tomorrow, nor does it commit the country to a specific reactor design. What it signifies is more profound: Serbia now allows itself to imagine nuclear energy as part of its long-term future, something that had been politically and legally forbidden for nearly forty years.
The reasons for this shift do not originate in ideology but in structural pressures that have been accumulating across the energy system. Serbia’s coal reserves remain abundant, but the quality of lignite has declined, mines are aging, extraction costs are rising and environmental obligations are becoming stricter. Thermal power plants, especially those in the TENT and Kostolac systems, operate under increasingly demanding maintenance schedules and face efficiency and emissions challenges. Hydropower, once the most stable complement to coal, is now exposed to climate volatility. Serbia’s reservoirs and run-of-river plants have already shown how sensitive they are to prolonged drought cycles, and projections for 2025 warn of a hydropower reduction of nearly a quarter. Renewable energy continues to grow, yet the grid absorbs it slowly and the lack of large-scale storage prevents renewables from replacing either coal or hydro in their stabilizing roles.
Analyses featured on serbia-energy.eu have repeatedly emphasized that Serbia risks entering the next decade without sufficient baseload electricity, especially during winter peaks or hydrological shortages. Electricity imports already rise during unfavourable conditions, but relying on regional markets exposes the country to volatile prices and supply risks. As the European Union accelerates its decarbonization agenda, Serbia faces rising external pressures to modernize, reduce emissions and align with continental energy strategies. These circumstances collectively created the moment in which nuclear energy re-emerged not as a controversial idea, but as a strategic option.
The French-led study did not present nuclear power as a fully designed project, but it did articulate a clear conclusion: Serbia possesses the geological, infrastructural and institutional prerequisites necessary to host nuclear reactors, provided that modern regulatory and technical frameworks are established. It also argued that nuclear generation could meaningfully enhance long-term energy security and help Serbia avoid increasing dependence on high-cost imports or aging thermal capacity. Financing schemes were deemed feasible, especially given the growing appetite among France, the European Union and multilateral institutions to support nuclear development as part of Europe’s broader low-carbon strategy.
The study also subtly shifted the national conversation toward Small Modular Reactors, or SMRs, the global frontier of nuclear innovation. SMRs differ drastically from the gigawatt-scale reactors built in previous decades. They are smaller, more modular, easier to finance, quicker to construct and designed with enhanced passive safety systems that require less human intervention. Their scale, generally ranging from 50 to 300 megawatts per unit, makes them appropriate for countries with medium-sized grids like Serbia’s. SMRs are still emerging technologies, but they are maturing quickly, and the early 2030s — when Serbia will experience the most acute pressure to replace coal — coincides almost perfectly with their expected commercial readiness.
The political dimension of nuclear energy cannot be separated from the technical one. Serbia’s energy ties historically include both Western and Eastern partnerships, and nuclear development invites a new alignment. France, which led the feasibility assessment, is the strongest nuclear advocate within Europe and would likely become Serbia’s primary strategic partner if Belgrade pursued nuclear construction. Engagement with French industry would also pull Serbia more distinctly into Europe’s energy and regulatory orbit. By contrast, collaboration with Russia’s nuclear sector would be complex in the current geopolitical climate. Serbia must now navigate this new terrain carefully, balancing its longstanding relationships with emerging demands of European integration.
Public perception presents another layer of complexity. For citizens who lived through the Chernobyl era, nuclear energy remains emotionally and symbolically tied to risk. Memories of contamination maps, iodine tablets and regional panic do not fade easily. Younger generations, however, have grown up in a different technological environment. For them, nuclear power is less a source of fear than a climate-policy tool, a low-carbon technology that many advanced nations treat as essential to their long-term energy security. The debate unfolding in Serbia reflects this generational divide. The government recognizes that any movement toward nuclear development must be accompanied by comprehensive public dialogue, transparent risk communication and strong institutional oversight. Without public legitimacy, nuclear energy cannot be sustainably integrated into national policy.
The lifting of the ban also forces Serbia to confront its infrastructural gaps. Decades without nuclear activity mean that Serbia must rebuild an entire regulatory and technical ecosystem from scratch. A nuclear regulatory authority must be strengthened and expanded. Engineers, operators and inspectors must be trained; partnerships with international institutions must be formalized; emergency response frameworks must be modernized. The grid must be upgraded to accommodate stable nuclear baseload while allowing renewables to expand. Waste management strategies must be scientifically sound and socially acceptable. Every element of nuclear integration requires not only technical preparation but also institutional maturity.
The regional context underscores why Serbia’s reconsideration is timely. Several neighbouring countries already operate or are developing nuclear facilities. Romania is building the first commercial SMR in Europe with American support. Bulgaria is expanding its Kozloduy facility. Slovenia and Croatia jointly operate the Krško nuclear plant and are considering upgrades. Hungary is progressing with its Paks II expansion. Across Central and Eastern Europe, nuclear power is returning as a strategic anchor of long-term energy systems. If the Western Balkans becomes a region partially stabilized by nuclear baseload, Serbia would face competitive disadvantages if it fails to develop similar capacity.
The significance of Serbia lifting the nuclear ban lies not in the certainty of nuclear construction, but in the opening of a strategic horizon that had been closed for decades. Serbia now has the option to explore nuclear energy as part of a future energy mix that integrates renewables, modernized hydropower, storage systems and regional interconnections. Nuclear power, if pursued, would not compete with renewables but rather enable their broader deployment by providing stable baseload and reducing the pressure on hydro and coal during demand peaks or climate-driven shortages.
The decision marks a shift from reactive energy planning toward long-term structural thinking. Serbia must still answer critical questions: whether the financial burden is manageable, whether international partnerships can be secured on favourable terms, whether regulatory readiness can be achieved in time, and whether society can accept a technology once defined by fear. But those questions can now be asked within an active policy framework rather than a prohibited one.
As serbia-energy.eu regularly notes, Serbia will soon face a decisive moment in its energy history. Coal is entering terminal decline, hydropower is no longer predictable, and renewables require stability they cannot yet provide alone. The lifting of the nuclear ban does not commit Serbia to atomic energy, but it acknowledges that without evaluating all available baseload technologies, the country risks entering the next decades with inadequate capacity, rising import dependence and weakened economic competitiveness.
The nuclear question in Serbia has evolved from a taboo into a strategic debate. Whether nuclear power becomes a defining pillar of Serbia’s energy architecture or remains an option never exercised will depend on the political will, institutional competence and public confidence that emerge in the next decade. But one thing is now certain: Serbia’s energy future will no longer be imagined without nuclear energy somewhere on the horizon.
