The Western Balkans and Southeast Europe are entering a new strategic energy era, one in which electricity — its production, exchange, security, and geopolitical meaning — carries more weight than gas pipelines ever did. By 2035, the region’s power map will look radically different from anything recognizable today. Coal will decline, hydropower will fluctuate under climate stress, renewables will surge unevenly across borders, and nuclear energy will return as the defining baseload force of the region. Serbia, long positioned between competing energy spheres, is suddenly at the center of this transformation. Its decision to lift the ban on nuclear development has not only altered its internal energy debate — it has reshaped the regional chessboard.
Whether Serbia ultimately selects a full-scale reactor, a series of small modular reactors, or a hybrid model that blends nuclear with advanced storage, the very act of considering nuclear power changes the dynamics of Southeast Europe. Neighbouring countries are now recalibrating their expectations and strategies, assessing how Serbia’s potential entry into the nuclear club will modify cross-border flows, industrial competitiveness, political alliances and long-term market pricing. Nuclear power is not a national choice; it is a regional intervention.
The first region to feel the impact is the Central European nuclear corridor, stretching from Slovenia and Croatia’s Krško facility, through Hungary’s Paks complex, to Romania’s ambitious SMR deployment. By 2035, all three of these countries will have significantly expanded nuclear capacity compared to today. Hungary will have progressed toward commissioning Paks II, despite geopolitical complexities. Romania will likely have at least two SMRs in operation or under construction, strengthening its position as a nuclear innovator in the region. Slovenia and Croatia may have advanced Krško II or a major refurbishment program tied to EU-backed decarbonisation financing.
Into this corridor enters Serbia. If Belgrade commits to nuclear by the late 2020s, construction will shape its economic, regulatory, and diplomatic posture for decades. Serbia would need to adopt international nuclear governance frameworks at a level that anchors it more firmly in the European institutional environment. It would also require cross-border safety agreements, cooling-water coordination, and environmental impact protocols with neighbors — especially Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Romania. This institutional anchoring would inevitably influence Serbia’s geopolitical orientation.
The regional implications become even more pronounced when considering nuclear’s effect on power flows. By 2035, Southeast Europe will operate a highly interconnected electricity system driven by variable renewable energy, flexible markets and large baseload anchors. Nuclear plants are not just generators. They are gravitational centers. They stabilize frequency, reduce volatility, and create long-term price anchors that shape investment decisions across entire regions. If Serbia adds its own nuclear capacity, the structure of Balkan power flows will shift fundamentally.
A Serbian nuclear plant — depending on its location — would modify the direction of winter baseload flows, reduce Serbia’s dependence on Romanian or Bulgarian exports during drought periods, and potentially enable Serbia to export surplus electricity during low-demand intervals. For countries like Montenegro, North Macedonia or Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia’s nuclear decision could redefine their import-export balances. Montenegro, heavily dependent on imports in certain intervals, would gain access to a stable baseload partner. North Macedonia could reduce exposure to Greek market volatility. Bosnia and Herzegovina, facing declining coal competitiveness, might incorporate Serbian nuclear imports into its decarbonisation planning.
At the same time, Serbia’s nuclear trajectory could accelerate or disrupt regional investment flows. Investors in renewables across Albania, Croatia, and Bulgaria will calculate their risk differently if Serbia becomes a long-term nuclear exporter or stabilizing hub. In securities markets, utilities with nuclear-linked PPAs or integration agreements may attract more predictable financing. Transmission operators will plan interconnectors with new priorities, optimizing stability rather than pure trade volumes. Nuclear, in this sense, becomes the anchor of a broader regional investment ecosystem.
But nuclear also introduces geopolitical tension. Countries that rely on electricity exports to Serbia may find their influence diminished. Romania, for example, increasingly relies on cross-border trade to balance its renewable variability. If Serbia becomes a nuclear-anchored electricity system, the regional dependency flows will invert. Serbia, long exposed to Romanian and Hungarian market conditions, could become a stabilizing node rather than a vulnerable consumer. Hungary’s political leverage, tied partly to its role in winter exchanges, would shift. Bulgaria’s ambitions to become a regional export hub through Kozloduy’s new units would encounter an additional competitor.
Cross-border consent processes add another layer. Nuclear plants cannot be developed without notifying and consulting neighboring states under international conventions such as Espoo. Serbia’s reactor siting would require environmental and risk assessments shared with Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Romania and possibly Montenegro. These processes are not technical formalities; they are geopolitical negotiations. Each country will evaluate Serbia’s nuclear ambitions through its own political lens.
Croatia and Slovenia, co-owners of Krško, will scrutinize Serbia’s safety protocols and may seek coordination frameworks that preserve their influence over regional nuclear governance. Bosnia and Herzegovina may raise environmental concerns, especially if the proposed site is close to its borders or connected water systems. Hungary may support Serbia’s nuclear trajectory if it aligns with Budapest’s broader energy-security strategy, or resist it if it perceives market competition. Romania, pursuing SMR leadership, may welcome Serbia’s alignment with Western nuclear suppliers but worry about timing that affects market integration.
The Balkan power map of 2035 will therefore be defined not just by reactors but by the diplomatic architecture built around them. Nuclear development forces countries to coordinate emergency response systems, radiation monitoring networks, cross-border evacuation planning, grid-stability agreements, frequency-control reserves and water-use rights for cooling. These are deep forms of energy interdependence. Serbia cannot build nuclear without becoming structurally intertwined with its neighbors. Whether that interdependence strengthens regional cooperation or deepens regional fault lines depends on political choices made long before reactor construction begins.
Yet nuclear is not the only force shaping the 2035 power map. Renewables — intermittent, dispersed and increasingly dominant — will drive the need for flexible markets and stronger grids. Climate patterns will weaken hydropower reliability. Coal will become economically and politically untenable. Gas will remain relevant but not central. In this shifting landscape, nuclear enters as the stabilizing backbone. The question is not whether nuclear changes the regional map but how Serbia’s participation reshapes the balance of power.
One of the most likely consequences is the emergence of a regional two-tier system. Countries with nuclear capacity — Romania, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria and potentially Serbia — will form a stability cluster, capable of anchoring regional markets, smoothing volatility and offering long-term price references. Countries without nuclear — Montenegro, North Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina — will increasingly rely on imports from this stability cluster. Their energy security will depend more heavily on regional cooperation and electricity diplomacy.
Serbia’s place within this two-tier system is pivotal. For decades, Serbia was considered a hybrid energy actor: partially self-sufficient, partially dependent, partially aligned with Western markets, partially exposed to Russian influence. Nuclear development would shift this identity. Serbia would move from the periphery to the core of regional energy governance. It would emerge not as a follower but as a system-defining actor with influence over price formation, supply stability, and long-term planning.
This shift would also affect domestic politics. Nuclear energy demands institutional maturity, regulatory independence and long-term policy continuity. These requirements could accelerate internal reforms — strengthening Serbia’s energy regulator, modernizing EPS governance, deepening grid modernization through EMS and aligning emergency frameworks with European standards. The nuclear question, in this sense, becomes a catalyst for modernization beyond the power sector.
The final dimension to consider is long-term market pricing. Nuclear power creates price floors and caps that influence both wholesale and retail markets. A Serbia with nuclear capacity would likely experience lower winter price spikes, greater predictability and reduced import dependence. This stability would shape industrial competitiveness, encouraging energy-intensive investments that rely on predictable electricity costs. Serbia’s manufacturing sector — from metallurgy to chemicals to high-tech fabrication — could benefit significantly.
Conversely, nuclear would also require high upfront costs, long construction periods and large financial commitments, potentially tying Serbia to international financing institutions or strategic partners. These financial alignments, too, reshape geopolitical positioning.
By 2035, the Balkan power map will feature more renewables, more interconnectors, more volatility and more demand for flexible capacity. Nuclear will be the anchor around which these forces stabilize. Serbia’s decision to consider nuclear thus places it at the center of a regional transformation that extends far beyond energy.
Serbia could become a stabilizing force — an exporter, a baseload provider, a market anchor and a geopolitical balancer. Or it could become a nuclear-dependent consumer if it fails to manage construction, financing and regulatory development effectively. The difference between these outcomes will depend on timing, partners and institutional readiness.
The nuclear question is no longer technical. It is the lens through which the entire region’s energy future must be understood. Serbia, by lifting its ban, has stepped onto the board. The next moves — diplomatic, financial, regulatory and technological — will determine its role in the European energy order of 2035.
