Azerbaijan’s rise in Serbia did not happen loudly. It happened through pipelines, memoranda, presidential visits, and a carefully constructed image of Baku as a reliable, forward-looking supplier. What began as a small diplomatic relationship has grown into one of the most strategically significant energy partnerships in the Western Balkans. Today, Azerbaijan is positioning itself as a Eurasian actor with real weight in South-East Europe—and Serbia has become one of its key regional anchor points.
The partnership is about gas, but not only gas. It is about power plants, green energy, mining, trade routes, and political leverage. And it is reshaping Serbia’s energy map in ways that are both subtle and deeply consequential.
The pipeline moment: When Azerbaijan tapped into the Balkans
Serbia’s gas market was, for decades, a one-channel system dominated by Russian supply. That changed when the Bulgaria–Serbia Gas Interconnector became operational, physically linking Serbia to the Southern Gas Corridor, the Caspian region’s main export artery to Europe.
The opening ceremony told the whole geopolitical story: the president of Azerbaijan standing alongside the Serbian and Bulgarian leadership in Niš, symbolically “switching on” Serbia’s first tangible connection to non-Russian gas.
Then came commercial contracts. Serbia’s gas company agreed to import several hundred million cubic meters of Azeri gas annually, with room to scale volumes significantly over the next years. Overnight, Azerbaijan became the second gas supplier for a country that had never had one.
The volumes are modest compared to Serbian demand, but strategically they are transformative. They give Serbia an alternative, a hedge, and—politically—the credibility to say it is diversifying.
A gas-fired power plant: Investment as influence
The pipeline was only step one. Within a year, Serbia and Azerbaijan had negotiated a 500 MW gas-fired power plant near Niš, backed by joint financing and long-term fuel supply from Azerbaijan. The project is positioned as a key part of Serbia’s energy transition away from coal.
For Azerbaijan, the plant is strategic:
It anchors long-term gas demand in Serbia.
It embeds Azerbaijani companies in Serbian infrastructure.
It transforms Baku from a simple commodity seller into a partner shaping Serbia’s electricity system.
For Serbia, it solves a political and technical dilemma: how to retire ageing coal units without risking blackouts. Gas-fired capacity becomes the bridge—to a future of renewables, but without the immediate instability that a rush toward wind and solar might bring.
But that bridge comes with a new dependency: a Serbian power plant that runs on Azerbaijani molecules.
Green energy, mining and a new portfolio of interests
Azerbaijan’s message to Serbia is increasingly about green gas, renewables, hydrogen, and modern mining. Baku wants to be seen not just as a fossil-fuel exporter but as a supplier of future-ready energy.
Serbia and Azerbaijan have signed agreements in:
renewable energy cooperation,
mining development,
technology exchange,
gas storage and logistics,
long-term energy planning.
These deals expand Azerbaijan’s presence horizontally—beyond pipelines and into broader energy governance.
This aligns with Baku’s new global narrative: positioning itself as a hybrid energy player, balancing its traditional gas sector with the optics of a country preparing for a post-fossil world.
For Serbia, this offers access to investment, technology, and a partner outside the usual EU–Russia binary.
Trade & connectivity: The Eurasian economic layer
Azerbaijan sees Serbia as an entry point into Central and Southern Europe. The logic is geographic and political:
Serbia sits between Central Europe, the Adriatic, and the wider Balkans.
It is non-EU but surrounded by EU members.
It is logistically plugged into pan-European corridors.
It maintains balanced relations with Russia, the EU, Turkey, the Gulf, and now Azerbaijan.
For Baku, Serbia is a place where Eurasian strategies can be tested without the constraints of EU membership or NATO alignment. This makes Serbia attractive for:
transit projects,
trade expansion,
logistics partnerships,
SME cooperation,
construction and infrastructure contracts.
The relationship is slowly expanding from energy into trade networks, industrial cooperation, and even cultural diplomacy.
Serbia’s calculus: Diversification, bargaining power and the multi-vector doctrine
Belgrade treats Azerbaijan as part of its long-standing multi-vector foreign policy.
Azerbaijan helps Serbia diversify gas supply. Even small volumes create political leverage. Belgrade can point to Azerbaijani contracts when discussing energy diversification with the EU, and when negotiating future gas terms with Russia.
This improves Serbia’s bargaining position.
Every cubic meter of non-Russian gas strengthens Belgrade’s negotiating hand.
Azerbaijan also fits the image Serbia wants: a partner with no Balkan historical baggage, a rising Eurasian power, and a state willing to invest without imposing political conditionality.
But there are risks. When gas flows from Azerbaijan were temporarily disrupted due to upstream technical issues in early 2025, Serbia saw how diversification can introduce vulnerabilities of its own. Diversification works only if alternative suppliers are stable.
Still, Serbia seems determined to deepen cooperation, not scale it back.
The EU angle: Quiet encouragement, quiet concern
The European Union’s view of Azerbaijan’s rise in Serbia is nuanced.
On one hand, Brussels supports Serbia’s connection to the Southern Gas Corridor. It fits the EU’s agenda of reducing Russian energy dominance in South-East Europe. On the other hand, Azerbaijan is a non-EU, non-democratic supplier—another external dependency the EU cannot fully control.
Serbia’s connection to Azeri gas therefore creates both alignment and tension:
Alignment, because it reduces Russian leverage.
Tension, because it increases the political and economic weight of another non-EU actor in the Balkans.
Still, EU institutions publicly frame Azerbaijan’s involvement positively, especially since 2022 when Europe began increasing its imports of Caspian gas.
Azerbaijan, for its part, uses Serbia to demonstrate relevance to Brussels—an energy partner that can deliver stability, flexibility, and a bit of geopolitical balance.
The winners & strategic leverage
Azerbaijan
Positions itself as the primary Eurasian gas player in the Balkans.
Transforms gas exports into long-term political capital.
Uses Serbia to showcase its regional influence and energy reliability.
Serbia
Gains a second gas supplier for the first time in its modern energy history.
Attracts new investments in power generation, green energy, and trade.
Strengthens its negotiating position with Russia and the EU.
The EU
Obtains a partial de-risking of Balkan gas markets.
Expands the influence of the Southern Gas Corridor deeper into South-East Europe.
Each gains something—but each also takes on new risks.
Azerbaijan arrives as a Eurasian power in South Europe
Azerbaijan’s role in Serbia is no longer symbolic. It is structural. Pipelines are built, power plants are negotiated, contracts are active, and political ties are deepening year after year.
Serbia gives Azerbaijan a gateway into the Balkans.
Azerbaijan gives Serbia diversification, investment, and geopolitical maneuverability.
The EU watches both with interest, hoping the Caspian can offset at least part of the region’s Russian dependency.
Azerbaijan has managed something rare:
to become a Eurasian player in South-East Europe through infrastructure, energy, diplomacy, and strategic patience.
